Articles
Burt Woolrich
The Information and Referral Federation
of Los Angeles County
El Monte, CA
Describes the experiences of the nation's largest generic I&R agency
during the 1992 civil disturbances following the verdict in the
first trial of the police officers charged with beating Rodney King
in southern California. With
the help of other agencies, INFO LINE quickly gathered and
maintained the most complete database of local crisisrelated human
services information.
INFO LINE specialists assisted approximately 4,860 callers who needed
information or had concerns directly related to the disturbance, in
addition to responding to a normal number of routine,
non-disturbance-related calls.
The agency also disseminated information to the community
through a number of secondary sources, including the. police
department, legal aid offices, and print and broadcast media.
INFO LINE was identified by print and broadcast media as a primary
source for accurate disaster-related information. Since the
disturbances, INFO LINE and a consortium of I&R-related
organizations have gained recognition as important players in any
disaster response effort in the area,
The article concludes with a discussion of procedural changes and
inter-agency cooperative arrangements implemented to
better deal with future disasters.
A brief addendum to the article goes on to discuss the effectiveness of
these procedures and arrangements in dealing with the wildfires
which hit Southern California after the article was originally
written.
INFO
LINE of Los Angeles is perhaps the largest generi c human services
I&R in the country. Our
staff of 70 employees (all paid) respond to over 210,000 requests
for help annually, and we maintain a computerized database of over
4,000 programs that serve the people of Los Angeles county.
The area we serve is also large: a county of over 4,000
square miles of mixed urban, suburban, rural, and desert regions
with a population of 8.8 million residents.
INFO
LINE's service is available 24 hours a day, 7
days a week, in both Spanish and English.
Staff can provide service in 9 other languages during regular
business hours. Service
in over 1 00 other languages can be provided via conference call
with local volunteers or, when necessary, through AT&T's
Language Line.
This
report focuses on INFO LINE's response to the civil disturbances
that erupted after the "not guilty" verdict on April 29, 1
992 in the first trial of the police officers charged with beating
Rodney King, and our efforts since then to be prepared for, and
included in the official planning for, a future disaster.
THE DISTURBANCES
Prior
to the civil disturbances of April-May, 1992, INFO LINE had had some
experience dealing with large-scale crises including earthquakes and
the Gulf War mobilization. From
these experiences, we knew that when the jury in the first Rodney
King beating trial returned its "not guilty" verdict and
people's anger flared into violence people would turn to us for
information, even though INFO LINE is not a disaster hotline.
As soon
as the disturbances began, our permanent Special Projects Team
started gathering information that was relevant to the situation.
Over the course of the crisis, the kinds of information the
public needed changed as the situation developed.
At first, freeway and bus route shutdowns, school and office
closings, and curfews were the types of information most urgently
needed. By the second day we were getting calls from people who needed to
find a bank, ATM, or check cashing service so they could buy food,
or an open pharmacy so they could get prescriptions filled. When taxi companies started providing transportation to
markets outside the area (since most markets in the impacted area
had been destroyed), people needed to know how to access that
service.
People
who were suddenly unemployed called for help in finding their way
through a system they never expected to utilize.
We received a number of calls from people who were unable to
apply for food stamps because their identification had been
destroyed in fires. We told them the procedure for getting new lDs as quickly as
possible, and referred them to agencies in their neighborhood that
could tide them over with emergency food until they could secure new
lDs.
Later,
while emergency food supplies, food stamps, and volunteer
opportunities continued to be heavily requested, people also needed
information about emergency loans and grants for rebuilding housing
and business.
Much
of the information that people needed, such as functioning
pharmacies and banks, was not the kind that is included in our
database. Even where
information was of a type that we ordinarily tracked (such as food
distribution sites), the situation in the disturbance area was
chaotic and volatile, with established agencies burned out and many
new distribution sites opening up in churches and storefronts.
Spontaneous Network
F3Y
the second day, we were participating in a spontaneous informal data
gathering and dissemination network.
Key Parts of the network, beside INFO LINE, were the local
Emergency Food and Shelter Program (the agency that distributes
Agencies
in this network took on tasks that were far outside their usual
mission, but absolutely necessary.
For example, it was essential that we have an accurate list
of the ZIP codes that were impacted by looting and arson, since ZIP
codes are the common denominator for matching callers with services,
but at the height of the disturbances no one had that information.
Two or three days into the crisis, the Emergency Food and
Shelter Program compiled and disseminated such a list.
First
AME has always had active human service programs, but they responded
to the crisis in their neighborhood by greatly increasing their
efforts and becoming a coordinating center for other, mostly
church-based programs that either started new or greatly expanded
during the disturbances. First
AME was an extremely valuable source of street-level information
throughout the period.
Much
of what was accomplished was based on the kind of personal, informal
knowledge and connections that [&Rs normally avoid.
For example, the foodbank had food to distribute to churches
in the affected area but could not find truckers willing to take it
in. One of our
Specialists called a friend who is an executive in the local
Teamster's Union and got the food moving.
The
Maxine Waters Election Headquarters Hotline was, by its nature, a
temporary organization and not one with which we had an established
relationship. We first
became aware of it through an article in the Los
Angeles Times. In contrast with the other agencies, it took two to three
days to establish working communications and trust with them.
After
Information
Dissemination
To
disseminate the flood of information we were gathering from this
network and ensure that our Specialists had the most current data,
our Resource Department issued written updates almost hourly
beginning on the first full day of the disturbances.
By the end of the first week this had tapered off to twice
daily, then to daily, then as needed.
During
the disturbances, we both retailed
information (that is, distributed it to individuals who called
us) and wholesaled it (distributing it to other entities that were using it
for their own needs and for further dissemination to the public).
Individuals
who did not already know about INFO LINE learned to call us from a
variety of sources:
-
The Los Angeles Times published our numbers as a basic source of disaster information every day for weeks, beginning Friday, May 1. The two major newspapers that serve the African-American community, the Sentinel and the Wave, also published our numbers throughout the period. Many radio and television stations broadcast our numbers during their live coverage of the disturbances.
-
On day two of the disturbance, the Los Angeles Police Department teletyped our voice and TDD numbers to all officers in the field so they could give it to people who needed human services and other basic information. This both ensured that residents had access to the most accurate information and that the LAPD officers were freed up for essential policing functions.
-
Many agencies that closed because of the disturbances on Thursday and Friday, April 30 and May 1, used their taped messages to refer callers to INFO LINE's numbers.
In
the two weeks beginning Wednesday evening, April 29, INFO LINE
Specialists handled approximately 4,860 calls from people who needed
information about the disturbances' These calls were in
addition to an almost normal number of non disturbance-related
calls. An uncounted
additional numbar of people received basic information about curfew,
school and government office closings, and public transportation
from our menu-driven phone system.
INFO
LINE's TDD service was one of the few sources of reliable
information for deaf people in the early days of the crisis.
The largest organization providing service to the deaf
community was forced to close because violence engulfed its
neighborhood and only one television channel captioned its live
broadcasts.
INFO LINE was also a major "wholesaler" of information:
-
Besides publishing our own numbers, the Times asked us to verify other human services information it printed on a daily basis.
-
We assisted the United Way in identifying resources for a poster of emergency response numbers. Shelter Partnership, a local coordinating and resources agency, asked us to identify shelters that had opened in response to the crisis that could use goods that it had available for distribution.
-
California Rural Legal Assistance obtained basic referral numbers from us which it then E-mailed to all legal aid offices in the state.
Technical
and Human Resources
Technology
played a big part in our ability to respond quickly and well. in the
first nights of the disorders, there were disturbances in our
immediate vicinity and the police could not ensure the security of
our facility. With our
System 75 phone system, we were able to forward calls to the homes
of our evening shift personnel so they could continue to provide
service while working in a safe environment.
Our
menu-driven phone system, which had been in operation only one week
when the crisis began, proved its worth by making it possible for us
to handle many more calls than we otherwise could have.
This was both because we could
Our
human resources were more crucial to our ability to respond than the
technology, though. For
several years, we have had a Special Projects Team that is ready to
take on new assignments at a moment's notice; their commitment and
creativity were critical components of our response.
Other I&R and Resource Specialists worked hours of
unplanned overtime, not only fielding the extra calls that poured in
but also filling in for staff that could not get to work because of
the hazards of travel at the beginning of the crisis.
Special
Service Lines
Within
a week, we had installed a new, fully automated 800 number to handle
the most common calls arising out of the disturbances.
This number was made available to all Los Angeles city
councilpersons, county supervisors, and selected other offices and
organizations for each to publicize as their own.
It was answered at INFO LINE with a neutral message
("You have reached the Los Angeles Disturbance Hotline.... This
hotline is sponsored by offices and agencies throughout the city and
county in response to the disturbances in Los Angeles.") Our
intent was to permit offices and organizations that felt that they
had to have an identified presence during the crisis to refer
callers to a professionally operated information source without
having to start their own. This
was a response to a proliferation of emergency lines of varying
quality that was creating a confusing situation for the public.
A total of 939 calls came into the hotline.
When
the crisis was over, we deactivated the hotline but retained the
number. This made it possible for us to offer the same service to
elected officials in advance of
the verdicts in the second trial of the police officers.
Throughout
the crisis, we maintained 24 hour service on the Elder Abuse
Hotline, which is one of our special contracts.
During a period when Adult Protective Services (APS) offices
were closed, we also handled their calls. in several instances when
In Homes Supportive Service workers could not reach their clients,
our Specialists worked closely with paramedics and police to ensure
the safety of home-bound elderly and disabled people. We guided Fire Department personnel step-by-step through APS
emergencies and instructed them on filing the necessary reports
afterwards. After APS
offices reopened, we shared our resources with them on a daily
basis.
Community
Information Project
An
offshoot of the crisis worth mentioning is the Community Information
Project, a greatly expanded I&R and outreach effort located in
the South-Central and Koreatown neighborhoods of Los Angeles.
The
Dayton Hudson Foundation, which distributes a portion of the profits
from Mervyn's and Target stores, wanted to respond to the crisis.
Their first plan was to set up a hotline, but they were told
by people they queried in Los Angeles that would duplicate INFO
LINE's efforts. So,
within a week of the outbreak of the disturbances, a staff person at
Mervyn's northern California headquarters called us to ask what we
would do if they gave us a grant.
That
was a question we were ready to answer.
We had already decided that we needed to be physically
located in the most heavily impacted areas rather than providing all
of our service by telephone from one central location.
Until the call came from Mervyn's, though, we did not know
where the money would come from for opening satellite offices.
In
an unusual and highly collaborative process that involved almost
daily calls and faxes between Mervyn's and INFO LINE, we developed
plans for neighborhood-based [&R.
With a one-year, $100,000 grant from Dayton Hudson, two of
our staff people were relocated to a county multi-service center in
the South-Central area and we developed a subcontract relationship
with the Korean Health Information, Education and Referral Agency (KHEIR)
which paid for one of their staff people to work full-time on the
project. These three
people did face-to-face I&R and extensive outreach to community
EFFORTS
IN THE FOLLOWING YEAR
In
evaluating our performance immediately after the most acute phase of
the crisis had ended, we felt we had responded well but we also felt
that luck and circumstance had a lot to do with that, and we could
not rely on luck and circumstance to get us through the next time.
Our efforts in the year following the disturbances were aimed
at institutionalizing the strengths that we had relied on in the
crisis and eliminating some weaknesses that had been revealed.
These efforts have focused on both organizational and
technological preparations.
A
primary effort was to be recognized by, and included in, disaster
response plans. Disaster
response planning in the Los Angeles area takes place in several
interlocking bodies. The
county has its Emergency Operations Team which includes the
sheriff's and fire departments and the Department of Public Social
Services (DPSS-the county welfare department).
Another
organization is the Southern California Voluntary Organizations
Active in Disasters (SCVOAD), which is the regional affiliate of the
national VOAD. All areas have a VOAD body, but in many areas it may be
inactive. VOADs are
typically made up of the Red Cross, Salvation Army, Civil Air
Patrol, and church organizations that are involved in disaster
response. They
typically do not include generic I&Rs and other agencies that
would be active in the recovery rather than the acute stage of a
disaster.
In
addition, the state has its disaster planning body, the federal
government has FEMA, and most, if not all, of the 88 incorporated
cities within Los Angeles County have their own bodies.
On
day six of the disturbances, INFO LINE was invited to participate in
a joint public-private "All Agency Meeting" at Red Cross
headquarters. The goal
of the meeting was to exchange information about what was being done
and what
Another
participant in that meeting was the DPSS representative on the
countywide emergency operations committee, who is a key player in
that group. I had met
him two years earlier at a workshop on the role of nonprofit
agencies during the Loma Prieta earthquake.
At that time, I had told him that INFO LINE felt it was
essential that we be included in official disaster planning.
We had had contact a few times since, but while he,
personally, seemed to share our view there had been no movement
towards including us in planning.
At
the Red Cross meeting, we again stressed the importance of human
service information in disaster response.
We spoke of "second-stage response," to distinguish
our role from that of public safety agencies and the nonprofits that
have disaster response mandates, such as the Red Cross and Salvation
Army. (We have since learned that, in the jargon of disaster
planners, this is known as "recovery" stage.) We pointed
out that even before the fires were extinguished, people needed the
kind of information that is customarily provided by a generic
I&R and the agencies we were linked with.
In
addition to advocating INFO LINE's own role in disaster response, we
have also been active through a consortium of I&R providers
known as the Los Angeles Access Network (LAAN).
LAAN has been meeting since 1989 to develop and facilitate
information exchanges between its members wh include libraries,
seniors' [&Rs, health and disability information providers, and
other organizations that are concerned about public access to human
service resource information. Its
attention had primarily been focused on developing a shared,
computerized database but after the disturbances it added disaster
response to its concerns.
In
July, 1993, both INFO LINE and LAAN were formally voted into SCVOAD.
INFO LINE has also been included in the county's official
plans for disaster response. Among
other things, this means that, if FEMA opens Disaster Assi stance
Centers in Los Angeles County, INFO LINE staff will be
LAAN
has taken on the assignment to develop a communications tree to take
the place of the spontaneous network that developed in April-May of
last year. The tree is
to be based on established lines of communications and hierarchical
relationships. For example, food pantries will communicate with the regional
foodbank and shelters with the Food and Shelter Board.
They, in turn, will communicate with each other and with INFO
LINE. The
communications tree will be as comprehensive as possible, and have
multiple redundancies to take into the account the likelihood that
some parts of the tree will not be operational in a crisis.
Internal
Changes
In
addition to these organizational efforts, we have made some internal
changes. We know that a
major earthquake, which is tt a prototypical disaster that everyone
in Southern California plans for, would initially overwhelm us and
everyone else. While we
cannot expect to. provide uninterrupted service in the event of
"The Big One," we have taken steps to make sure that we
are back in operation as quickly as possible.
Although
we found that the cost of buying a backup electrical generator large
enough to supply power for our operation was prohibitive, we have
wire d our building so it is ready for a generator as soon as one is
available from the army or national guard.
Second, we are equipping ourselves with laptop computers so
we can take our database of resources out to where it is most needed
in the community. We
are investigating the use of radio communications with satellite
operations, because the regular and cellular telephone systems would
certainly be overwhelmed even if they are not
knocked
out of commission.
A
third thing we have done to better prepare for the next crisis is to
greatly improve our TDD (Telecommunications
We've
purchased a menu-driven, computerized TDD that permits us to handle
four TDD calls simultaneously, to provide basic information by
pre-recorded messages, and which allows TDD callers to leave their
phone numbers and messages for a call-back.
We
gladly accept the additional responsibilities of being a recognized
player on the disaster response team; after all, we have worked for
a long time to be entrusted with them.
We also accept them knowing that they are very serious and,
having made these commitments, we have to be prepared to carry them
out under unforeseeable and difficult circumstances.
Afterword
As
this addendum is being written on November 8, much of what was
described as theoretical concepts is being tested in practice as a
result of the wildfires which swept through Southern California in
late October and early November.
Two
weeks before the first fires broke out, a newly-formed committee met
to develop disaster response guidelines for INFO LINE.
The committee agreed on a general outline for a disaster
operations plan, and divided up responsibility for drafting sections
of it.
Before
we could reconvene to review those drafts, we had
This
time, instead of INFO LINE calling around to county
Three
Disaster Application Centers (DAC's) have been opened in Los Angeles
County following the federal declaration of a disaster.
INFO LINE has assigned a staff person to each DAC, 1 0 hours
a day, 7 days a week, for the as yet to be determined duration of
the emergency. When the
first center opened, the FEMA staff person managing it did not
understand the role that a generic I&R could play and questioned
the appropriateness of our being there until the county person
intervened on our behalf. When
the two other centers opened a week later, FEMA staff were well
aware of who we are and what we could bring to the total operation.
We were welcomed in. Much
of our value to the DAC's is based on services that we provide to
the other participating agencies, in addition to what we provide
directly to the public.
There
is much more to be said about this disaster mobilization, but it
will have to wait. We
are right in the middle of the situation right now, which means that
we have not had time to analyze the experience and that we are too
busy to stop and do that now. I
expect that we will propose a workshop on disaster response at the
1994 AIRS Conference in Tucson.
At that time, we can provide new information about our
response to this disaster and our progress in disaster planning.
I fervently hope we will not have any new disasters to report
on by May.
